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THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY. By Gerhard von Glahn. Minne-
apolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1957. Pp. 350. $6.50.
"Silent enim leges inter arn," wrote Cicero.' He could have added--doubt-
less in more Ciceronian Latin-sed non iurisconsulti. Long before the end of
World War II, scholars of all belligerent and many neutral nations had begun
to pour forth a mighty torrent of words on the laws of war, a gloss bearing
about the same quantitative relationship to the rather skimpy texts of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions that the literature of Christian apologetics,
exegesis and hermeneutics bears to the New Testament. Professor von Glahn
has set himself the task of seining in this turbid flood, apparently with the
praiseworthy intent of reducing to manageable size the consensus of more or
less civilized nations on what the law of belligerent occupation is or ought to be.
The role of the writer on international law, and particularly on the law of
war, is, at least in common-law countries, unique. The law of war has essen-
tially two sources: treaties and custom. The treaties are of unquestioned au-
thority but full of deliberate ambiguities 2 which can only be elucidated--given
solid content and accepted meaning-by the decisions of courts, the practice
of nations and the opinions of savants. The first are scanty, and the second
is often deplorable, if not actually in violation of those treaty provisions which
are explicit. Hence, a gratifying and unusual weight is accorded to the views
of scholarly writers-mostly, to be sure, by other scholarly writers, but some-
times by the authorities who shape the policies of belligerents and the states-
men who draft new treaties. If the hardships of war and occupation have been
appreciably lessened over the last few centuries, much of the credit must go to
the writers.
The experience of the last few decades might well conduce to the dismal
conclusion that no such lessening is noticeable and that the labors of Professor
von Glahn and his fellows have been so much intellectual brutum fulmen. One
has to go far back indeed to find anything comparable to the occupation regimes
of the Nazis and Japanese. But the saving point is that the mass killings,
deportations and systematic looting practiced by those governments in occupied
territory represented a sharp deviation from what had by their day become the
practice of civilized nations-a deviation which was denounced not only by their
L M. TULLIUS CICERO, PRO MILONE § IV, 1 II.
2. See, e.g., articles 43, 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, the former obligating an
occupant to respect "unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the [occupied] coun-
try" and the latter providing that "a receipt shall be given [for requisitions in kind], and
the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible"-by whom is not stated.
See ScoTr, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 123, 125
(1915).
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victims but by most of the rest of the world, and which was punished after the
war with remarkably little dissent, and even with the acquiescence of a sub-
stantial number of Germans and Japanese. Such enlightened views are not
innate in mankind. The Old Testament, of course, is full of appalling massacres,
some of them not only tolerated but prescribed by the mores of the time.3 Nor
would it have occurred to a statesman of classic antiquity to question the legal-
ity of such conduct. In the course of the Peloponnesian War, for example,
the Athenians determined, not by the act of any dictator but by the direct vote
of the enlightened democracy, to discipline Mitylene, an ally which had defected,
by putting to death the entire adult male population-including those who had
remained loyal to Athens-and enslaving the women and children. They re-
versed the decision the next day by a very close vote, largely on grounds of
expediency, and contented themselves with the execution of about a thousand
Mitylenians who had in fact been active in the rebellion. 4 The Spartans were
no better. 5 So far as history records, neither of these glories of Hellas was
subjected to reproach from any quarter for their treatment of the conquered.
The repressive measures taken against partisans and guerillas by Nazi occu-
pants were undoubtedly harsh, but Himmler himself would probably have hesi-
tated at the steps taken by Marcus Licinius Crassus to suppress the servile
revolt led by Spartacus.6 Crassus was not regarded as a monster of cruelty;
he was, in fact, awarded a triumph. Many similar examples could be cited,
down to comparatively modern times. The distinction between those ages and
this lies in the creation of a climate of world opinion in which the commission
of an atrocity is at least embarrassing, and possibly dangerous, to the com-
mitter. The conduct of the Soviet government in Hungary, for example, though
bad enough, might well have been very much worse if its desired action had
not been so obviously inconsistent with the appearance it wished to present
to the world. And the existence of international standards, to which that gov-
ernment was reluctant to do more extreme violence than required by its
estimate of the political situation, is in some measure due to the accumulated
weight of works like Professor von Glahn's.
3. See, e.g., I Samuel, 15:3, 8-11, 32-34.
4. THUCYDIDES, PELOPONNESIAN WAR 193-205 (Crawley transl. 1874). The Athenians,
having changed their minds, despatched a second galley to overtake the one which had
sailed the day before to carry the original order to the Athenian commander on Lesbos.
Stimulated by the promise of a substantial cash bonus (and possibly by considerations of
humanity) the rowers of the second galley bent to their oars with such effect that they
arrived just in time to stop the massacre.
5. On the urging of their Theban allies, the Lacedaemonians actually meted out such
treatment to the little city of Plataea, which had so distinguished itself in the Persian
wars. Id. at 216-18. It is interesting to note that Thucydides condemns as cruel the first
Athenian vote on Mitylene but chronicles without comment the fate of Plataea-which
suggests that, in his view, the vice of the Athenian policy lay only in the fact that it con-
templated the massacre of friends as well as enemies.
6. He crucified 6,000 captured slaves along the road from Capua to Rome. See 3
MOMASEN, R6MIscHE GEScrncTE bk. 5, c. II (1885).
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That weight is considerable. Professor von Glahn has performed the remark-
able feat of producing a ponderous tome in a mere 350 pages weighing no more
than two pounds. He has done this partly by weighting down his text with
896 footnotes and a bibliography containing some 700 items, and partly by the
employment of a singularly heavy-footed style ;7 but it must be conceded that in
large part the feat is attributable to sheer slogging scholarship and the com-
pression of voluminous materials into a comparatively small space. If The
Occupation of Enemy Territory does not contain a great deal of original
thought, it is at least a desk-size encyclopedia of learning on its topic. Here and
there one finds a dogmatic statement of a debatable proposition-for example
the flat assertion that "indigenous courts have no right whatsoever (during
belligerent occupation) to try enemy persons (that is, individuals of the occu-
pant's nationality or that of any of his allies in the wyar) for any and all acts
committed by them in the course of hostilities in the broadest sense of the term,
even if such acts are in the nature of war crimes."'8 It is doubtful whether that
immunity extends beyond members of the occupant's armed forces, 9 regardless
of their nationality; and it is probable that the occupant can subject members
of his forces, and a fortiori persons of his nationality, to the jurisdiction of the
local courts.10 Equally dubious is the unqualified statement that "decisions
handed down by the military tribunals of the occupant lose their validity at the
end of the occupation unless otherwise provided for in a treaty of peace.""
It would seem more reasonable to hold that a decision of a military government
court, made in a case within the jurisdiction lawfully conferred on it by the
occupant, should be accorded the same treatment as any other decision of a
competent court in the occupied territory. 12
7. See, e.g., p. 23: "[N]o advocate of revision of the laws of war in favor of collective
security forces can deny that armed action against an aggressor, whether it is labeled a
war or a police action, is not an armed conflict in the meaning of those 1949 instruments."
The meaning of this cumbrous sentence is the exact opposite of what the author probably
intended.
S. P. 112.
9. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878) ; cf. In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp.
455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
10. Cf. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109
(1901). In both cases, American citizens were held triable by courts of the American mili-
tary government of occupied foreign territory; and in the Madsen case, the petitioner was
deemed to be a member of the occupying forces. Both courts applied the indigenous law
of the occupied territory. In neither is there any suggestion that the result would have been
different if the military government had provided for trial by the indigenous courts. The
Court regarded both situations (Germany after World War II and Cuba after the Spanish-
American War) as cases of belligerent occupation of enemy territory, although in both
hostilities had ended.
11. P. 258.
12. Cf. Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276 (1874).
A caveat must be entered with respect to criminal sentences imposed by an occupation tri-
bunal for an offense against the occupant's security regulations, however lawful those
regulations might be, especially if the act were not otherwise criminal. It would be too
much to expect a returning sovereign to leave in jail one who is, from its standpoint, a
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These are comparatively minor matters. More fundamental is the author's
espousal of the doctrine that neither the Hague Regulations nor the customary
law of belligerent occupation apply after the end of military operations against
an enemy still in the field. 13 Specifically, as applied to Germany, he believes
that "only limitations resting on grounds of humanity could be said to have
been binding on the victorious Allies during the post-surrender period."'1 4 He
arrives at this conclusion by a somewhat curious route. He appears to believe
that most of the American denazification program in Germany-including the
eradication of Nazi influence on education, the repeal of characteristic Nazi
laws, such as the Niirnberg racial laws, and even the abolition of the totali-
tarian form of government-would have violated the Hague Regulations and
the customary law of belligerent occupation, had those laws been applicable.,;
But he balks, very rightly, at saying that international law forbade the Allies
to achieve the very purposes for which they fought the war unless they took
the extreme step of an outright annexation of Germany. He resolves the
dilemma by concluding that the law of belligerent occupation ceases to be effec-
tive the moment that one party surrenders. This is dangerous doctrine. Pre-
cisely at that time, the conquered and occupied territory stands in most need
of whatever protection is afforded by international law.16 It would be safer to
go a little more slowly and to assume as a first proposition that international
law draws no sharp line between occupation durante bello and occupation after
the end of hostilities but prior to definite settlement of the status of the occupied
territory.17 It can be further argued that nothing in the corpus of the law of
patriot. Yet this caveat has an unfortunate corollary; an occupant may be expected to
resort freely to the death penalty for offenses against its security, on the ground that nothing
else can be expected to stick. Article 68 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War attempts to counteract this practical con-
sideration by prohibiting the infliction of the death penalty under the ordinances of the
occupant except where the accused is guilty of espionage, "serious acts of sabotage against
the military installations" of the occupant or "intentional offences which have caused the
death of one or more persons, provided that such offences were punishable by death under
the law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation began." Aside from the fact
that some signatories, including the United States, made reservations to this article, the
phrase "serious acts of sabotage against . . military installations" leaves a good deal of
leeway for construction. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 3938, GENERAL FOREIGN
POLICY SERIEs 34, 185 (1950).
13. See, e.g., pp. 27-28, 117, 281.
14. P. 283.
15. See, e.g., pp. 57-67. Rather inconsistently, he makes an exception of the suspension
of the Volksgerichtsh6fe and other peculiarly Nazi courts. Pp. 106-07.
16. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War specifically provides (art. 6) that it shall apply for a year after "the general
close of military operations"-whatever that means-and that certain of its more funda-
mental provisions shall apply for the duration of the occupation. But that convention falls
far short of protecting all the rights covered by the pre-existing law of belligerent occupa-
tion. See U.S. DWP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 3938, GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY SERIEs 34, 166
(1950).
17. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 360 (1952) ; Burke v. Milteuberger, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 519, 524 (1873). See Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 610 (6th Cir. 1951).
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belligerent occupation was inconsistent with the Allies' abolition, for example,
of the Nfirnberg racial laws; in light of their war aims and the very broad con-
struction traditionally given the phrase, they can fairly be said to have been
"absolutely prevented" from respecting such a law.'8 The reform of the Ger-
man educational system and the abolition of totalitarian forms of government
can be similarly justified.' The laws of war are likely to do more real good
if they set themselves the modest goal of protecting the persons and property
of noncombatants, and do that at all times, than if they purport to circumscribe
a belligerent's achievement of his political aims until actual hostilities have
ended and then vanish altogether. For similar reasons, Professor von Glahn's
thesis that the law of war ought to distinguish between aggressor nations and
their victims-as, for instance, by giving lawful combatant status to guerillas
fighting for the latter and leaving the former's partisans in their present un-
protected status 20 seems of dubious practicality. The trouble is that in the
last century, at least, there has been hardly any belligerent which did not claim
to be a victim of aggression. It is hard enough to enforce the laws of war with-
out having to determine, as a preliminary, who started the particular war.
Professor von Glahn devotes a chapter to an admittedly summary examination
of the subject of punishment of violations of the laws of war. This topic has
not escaped the attention of other writers, and his chapter is mainly useful for
purposes of reference. But he has largely ignored the potentialities of judicial
enforcement of those laws through civil courts which are independent of the
occupant, either because they are sitting in another country, or because their
proceedings take place after the end of the occupation or because they are the
occupant's own domestic courts, exercising under the occupant's own polity
some power of control over the actions of its military and political authorities.
There is, for example, a small but growing body of case law in the United
States which suggests that its courts will apply the law of war to the acts of an
occupant very much as they would apply the Constitution to an act of Congress
or the President: that is to say, an ordinance or other act of military govern-
ment will be treated as valid, and binding on parties affected, if it does not
exceed the powers allowed by treaties and customary law, and will be treated
as void if it contravenes international law. 2 1 No American court has yet struck
down an act of American military government on such grounds,2 but, if such
18. See note 2 supra.
19. It must be admitted that the decartelization laws of the Western Allies present a
tougher exercise in casuistry-although, in so far as they contributed to the economic re-
surgence of West Germany, they might be brought within the occupant's duty to restore
and ensure public order and safety.
20. See, e.g., pp. 53, 171.
21. See, e.g., State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir.
1953) ; Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951).
22. See, however, Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913). The Court held an srdi-
nance of American military government invalid because inconsistent with the President's
orders to the Military Governor; but the Court laid some stress on the fact that the Presi-
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an act could be brought within the jurisdiction of an American court,23 there
is no compelling reason why it should have greater immunity from review than
one of a foreign occupation authority. Professor von Glahn has also ignored-
reasonably enough, since he had ample ground to cover without getting into
the maze of American constitutional law-the related question of the applica-
bility of the Constitution of the United States, and particularly the Bill of
Rights, to the actions of American military government in occupied foreign
territory. The orthodox view would certainly deny any application ;24 but there
have been indications that the classic rule might be subjected to some altera-
tion if a proper case were presented.25 The development in civilized nations of
a concept that the occupant's domestic courts have a duty and power to check
violations of the law of war is greatly to be desired. Otherwise, enforcement
of the law of belligerent occupation, so carefully collated in Professor von
Glahn's pandect, must continue to rely on the self-restraint of occupants, which
is risky, and postwar prosecution of the losers, which is effective but one-sided.
Of course, it will be long before any such judicial independence can be expected
to develop in some countries, but that is no reason why the seed should not be
sown in soil where it has a chance to grow.
Professor von Glahn has produced a well-digested and well-organized com-
pendium of the substantive law of belligerent occupation. Its virtues consider-
ably outweigh its defects. To all those who have the responsibility of applying
or enforcing that part of the law of war, The Occupation of Enemy Territory
will be a convenience.
JOSEPH W. BIsHoP, JR. t
dent's order was an expression of accepted principles of international law. The point at
issue would have been raised if the President had authorized or tolerated military gov-
ernment ordinances in violation of international law. To the same effect, see also MacLeod
v. United States, 229 U.S. 416 (1913).
23. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court held, through Justice
Jackson, that the writ of habeas corpus was not available to a nonresident enemy alien
and said, in a dictum which was probably not very carefully considered, that rights of
alien prisoners of 'war under the Geneva Convention of 1929 could be "vindicated ... only
through protests and intervention of protecting powers." Id. at 789 n.14. There was
a vigorous and cogent dissent. I find it hard to believe that if a prisoner of war were, let
us say, sentenced to death for attempting to escape, in violation of the explicit provisions
of the Convention, the present Court would thus wash its hands of the matter.
24. See, e.g., Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901) ; Mechanics' and Traders' Bank
v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276 (1874). See also Fairman, Some New Problems
of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587, 623-26 (1949).
25. See Black, J., dissenting in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) ; cf.
Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951). As
Justice Black made clear, not every part of the Bill of Rights would be held applicable in
occupied territory. For one thing, it seems probable that the introduction of some of the
refinements of the Bill of Rights in favor of criminal defendants might, in countries where
criminals have traditionally been given shorter shrift, collide with the occupant's duty to
restore and ensure public order and safety.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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